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HI
ARGUMENT
Point I
SALT LAKE CITY ORDINANCE 12,80.070(1) IS A REASONABLE AND VALID
EXERCISE OF THE POWER TO REGULATE BICYCLE TRAFFIC GRANTED TO
CITIES BY LAW.
A.

Background

Appellees have framed the legal issue in this case to be whether state legislation
prohibits bicyclists from riding against traffic1, thus invalidating any municipal ordinance to
the contrary. Appellees Brief (hereinafter "Brief) at 1.
Appellees argue that this case involves "the interpretation of state legislation and its
relation to a conflicting municipal ordinance." Id This argument presumes, without analysis,
that conflict exists between the state statutes and the ordinance at issue. Appellants dispute

throughout their Brief, Appellees characterize Hansen's travel in the left-hand bicycle
lane as "riding against traffic." Nowhere in the statutes or other authority cited by Appellees is
the term "riding against traffic" used or defined. In the context used by Appellees, one gets the
impression that "riding against traffic" creates some sort of impermissible conflict between the
bicyclist and cars traveling on the roadway. In reality no such conflict exists. By definition, a
bicycle lane is designed for travel only by bicycles. Other vehicular traffic is expressly
prohibited from traveling in a bicycle lane. Thus what happens is the traffic in different travel
lanes is next to each other. So long as each traveler obeys the law and travels in his appropriate
lane, there should be no problem. A conflict could only occur if a bicycle strayed into the
roadway, or a car into the bicycle lane. This is no greater risk than that of a car crossing the
center lane into opposing traffic. The argument in favor of such bicycle lanes is that they remove
bicycles, for the most part, from any need to travel upon that portion of a roadway reserved for
cars, thus avoiding conflicts with other vehicles traveling in either direction.
1

that. Nowhere in the state legislation is the term "riding with or against traffic" used
respecting travel by bicycles. Thus, there is no prohibition against "riding against traffic/' nor
is that term defined anywhere in state law.
The state statutes and the city ordinance at issue refer to travel being on the "right-hand
or left-hand" side of a roadway. Notwithstanding, Appellees refer to Hansen's use of the lefthand bicycle lane as "riding against traffic." By characterizing travel in the left-hand bicycle
lane as "against traffic," Appellees attempt to create the idea that there is an actual conflict in
the traveled area between the bicyclist and the motorist coming from an opposite direction.
Assuming all drivers obey the law and stay in the travel lanes designated for travel (cars on the
roadway and bicycles in the bicycle lane) there is no conflict between the cars and bicycles.
Seef.n. 1, supra.
Appellees have correctly stated the issue before the trial court as being whether or not
"[T]he Utah Code prohibits bicyclists from riding in a left-hand bicycle lane2." Brief at 3.
Both parties sought partial summary judgment below. Plaintiff argued that as a matter
of law, Hansen was legally entitled to rely on the existing ordinance and to travel eastbound
in the left-hand bicycle lane at the time of the collision. See Appellants' Brief at Point I.

2

Appellees persist in appending the term "against traffic" every time they refer to travel
in the left-hand bicycle lane, even though this term is not used in the statutes or ordinance at
issue. The real issue is herein is whether the mandate that bicycles traveling at less than normal
speed (U.C.A. § 41-6-87)must ride, as near as practicable to the right hand side of the roadway,
is subject to the express exception contained in Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-87(3) that bicycle lanes
shall be used if provided. Moreover, there is no condition limiting the side of the roadway where
such lanes may be placed.
2

Defendants argued that "Utah Code Ann. § 41 -6-87 requires bicyclists to ride with, not against,
traffic even when the bicyclist is in a marked bicycle lane." Brief at 4.
After expressly declining to find the city ordinance invalid, the trial court ruled that it
was against Utah law to travel against the flow of traffic and that there was no indication that
travel by bicycles against the flow of traffic was approved3. R. 164. Having so ruled the court
then stated:
The jury instructions will have to be properly tailored that Plaintiff was not
justified by ordinance nor state law in traveling in the direction he was against
traffic (emphasis added). R. 164.
Appellees argue that the trial court correctly determined that state legislation prohibited
bicycling against the flow of traffic and that any city ordinance purporting to allow otherwise
(e.g. Ord. 12.80.070) is in conflict with state law. For this reason, Appellees claim the trial
court decision should be affirmed. Brief at 5.
B.

Argument
1.

State Statutes do not require that Ordinance 12-80-070 be declared to be invalid.

Appellees' Point One argues that state law "requires bicyclists to ride with traffic."
Appellees then posit that because the Salt Lake City Ordinance specifically allows travel by
3

The trial court stated this conclusion without citation to authority and so one is left to
speculate as to its foundation. As noted in f.n. 1, supra, the terms "against traffic" and "traveling
against traffic" are not defined or used in the Utah Code sections cited to the trial court by the
parties. Counsel has not been able tofindthese terms in the Motor Vehicle Code. The fact that
Hansen was traveling in a designated bicycle lane, which lanes are expressly excluded, by § 416-87(3), from the mandate that when traveling at less than normal traffic speed one must be as
near as possible to the right-hand side of the roadway, would appear to belie Appellees'
arguments that such travel is prohibited by the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-87.
3

a bicyclist in the left-hand bicycle lane within Salt Lake City, the Ordinance is in conflict with
state law and, therefore, must be held to be invalid. Brief at 5.
Appellees then correctly state that while U.C. A. §41-6-17 expressly delegates to cities
the power to regulate bicycle traffic within the city, such regulation cannot allow that which
is prohibited by or inconsistent with state law. Brief at 6-7. Appellees correctly state that the
test is whether the ordinance permits that which the statute forbids. Appellees then argue:
[T]he Ordinance is invalid because it conflicts with U.C.A. § 41-6-87; the
ordinance purports to permit what the statute prohibits-bicycling against the
flow of traffic. Brief at 7.
Without any citation to legislative history or other authority, Appellees posit that U.C. A.
§ 41-6-87 clearly prohibits bicyclists from riding against traffic. This unfounded conclusion
cannot withstand logical scrutiny. U.C. A. § 41 -6-87 says nothing about "riding against traffic."
Broken down to its basic elements, the statute is easily understood. The statute first sets
forth a basic requirement; bicycles traveling at less than the normal speed at the time and place
and under the conditions then existing shall ride as near as practicable to the right hand edge
of the roadway. Thus, the basic requirement is that if a bicyclist is riding in a "roadway" and
is traveling at less than normal speed, he must travel as near to the right-hand side of the
roadway as possible. Thus two conditions must exist for this statute to apply. First, the
bicyclist must be traveling on a roadway. Second, he must be traveling at less than the normal
speed. Nothing is said about traveling with or against traffic.

4

Having thus set out the basic requirement of right-hand side travel on a roadway for
bicyclists traveling below normal speed, the legislature then proceeded to delineate a number
of additional situations where right-side travel was not required. These included overtaking
and passing another car or bicycle; when preparing to make a left turn at an intersection or into
a private road or driveway; and when necessary to avoid certain defined conditions [U.C.A.
§ 41-6-87(1)], and if a usable path for bicycles has been provided adjacent to a roadway,
bicycle riders shall use the path an4 not the roadway [U.C.A. § 41-6-87(3)(1989)].
The statutory scheme is clear. Subject to defined conditions, and delineated exceptions,
the basic rule is that bicycle riders shall ride as near as possible to the right-side of the road.
The legislature clearly had in mind exceptions to the rule. It did not by its terms prohibit
"riding against traffic." It merely said that under defined circumstances and subject to defined
exceptions, one must ride as close as feasible to the right-hand side of the roadway.
The problem with the Appellees' argument is that it presumes the legislature intended
by U.C.A. § 41-6-87 to prohibit riding "against traffic," without defining that term. That
presumption is not supported by legislative history or legal authority.
Appellees agree that legislative intent is furthered by giving effect to the purpose of the
statute, which is determined by looking at the plain language, assuming each term is used
advisedly and reading the words literally. Brief at 8. There is no argument that the Motor

5

Vehicle Code was adopted to promote public safety. The issue is whether Appellees' reading
of the intent of the legislature from the plain words of the statute is correct.4
Appellees argue that it is obvious that the intent of the legislature was to require
bicycles to ride on the right-hand edge of the roadway so they are riding "with traffic" as
opposed to "against traffic." Brief at 9. When used in this context, it is obvious that what
Appellees mean by "with traffic" and "against traffic" is the possibility of a conflict within the
travel lanes of a roadway between vehicles traveling in different directions. Thus, if a bicyclist
is traveling with traffic, he is traveling in the same direction as the flow of other vehicles on
the roadway. "Against traffic" would refer to travel on a portion of the roadway designed for
travel by other vehicles traveling in the opposite direction.
Using this frame of reference, the characterization by Appellees of Hansen's travel in
the left-hand bicycle lane as being "against traffic" is by definition incorrect. First, the bicycle
lane is, by definition, not a part of the traveled portion of the roadway5; and second, a bicycle

4

We are left with interpreting the legislative intent from the words of the statute because
Defendants below presented no evidence of any kind to the trial court on this issue, and for that
reason the trial court declined to find the ordinance invalid. R. 164
5

Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-1(39) defines "Roadway" as "[T]hat portion of highway
improved, designed, or ordinarily used for vehicular travel, exclusive of the sidewalk, berm, or
shoulder, even though any of them are used by persons riding bicycles..." Vehicle" is defined in §
41-6-1(55) as "[E]very device in, upon, or by which any person or property is or may be
transported or drawn upon a highway." The term "Highway" is defined in § 41-6-1(15) as "[T]he
entire width between property lines of every way or place of any nature when any part of it is
open to the use of the public as a matter of right for vehicular travel." Thus, a bicycle lane is part
of a highway, but not of the "Roadway" since by regulation, only bicycles can legally travel in a
bicycle lane. Clearly the Salt Lake City bicycle lanes are within the mandate of § 41-6-87(3) that
bicycles shall use such lanes when they are available. Such use gets the bicycle rider out of the
6

rider is not in conflict with other vehicles since only bicycles can travel in the bicycle lane. A
bicyclist in a designated bicycle lane (where vehicular traffic is prohibited) by definition is not
traveling on a "Roadway." Therefore, he is not subject to the mandates of U.C.A. § 41-6-87
because the statute applies only to the operation of a bicycle upon a "roadway", as that term
is defined in §41-6-1(39).
Appellees argue that each statutory term was used advisedly and that words should be
given their literal meaning. If so, Ordinance 12.80.070 is clearly a valid exercise of the power
granted to the city to regulate bicycle operations [U.C.A. §41-6-17(h)]. U.C.A. § 41-6-87(3)
expressly provides that if bicycle paths (lanes) are provided adjacent6 to a roadway, bicyclists
are to use such lanes for bicycle travel. The right-hand travel mandate applies, by its terms,
only to travel on a "Roadway". By definition, the bicycle lanes on 200 South in Salt Lake City
are not part of the "Roadway" and hence, § 41-6-87 does not require right-hand-side travel7.

"Roadway" and into a lane where he will not be traveling with other vehicular traffic.
6

Webster's New International Dictionary, 2nd Ed.(1937), unabridged, defines adjacent as
"Lying near; close; contiguous; neighboring; bordering; meeting; touching." Thus bicycles lanes
which border the north and south sides of the traveled portion of 200 South "ordinarily used for
vehicular traffic" (the "Roadway") are "adjacent" by definition.
7

In addition, by definition, the right-hand-travel mandate of U.C.A. § 41-6-87 would only
apply if Hansen were traveling at less than "normal speed." The undisputed testimony is that
Hansen was in fact traveling at approximately 20 miles-per-hour, clearly a normal speed in a 30
miles-per hour speed zone. Thus, under the circumstances, one could logically argue that even if
he were traveling on the "roadway", U.C.A. § 41-6-87 did not require him to be in the right-hand
lane on the edge of the roadway.
7

2.

Ordinance 12.80.070 is presumptively valid
The trial court specifically stated that Defendants failed to present any evidence to

support their claim that Ordinance 12.80.070 was not a valid exercise of the police power. The
trail court then specifically declined to rule on that aspect of the case. Appellees have not
appealed that ruling, and have not argued to the contrary in their brief8.
As a general rule, legislative enactments are presumptively valid. Laney v. City of
Fairview. 2002 Utah 79 (Utah 2002); State v MohL 901 P.2d 991 (Utah 1995); City of
Montecello v. Christensen. 788 P.2d 513 (Utah 1990). This rule also applies to legislative
enactments of a city. Ralph L. Wadsworth Construction, Inc. V. West Jordan City, 999 P.2d
1240 (Utah App. 2000); Harmon City, Inc., v. Draper City, 997 P.2d 321 (Utah App. 2000).
Given the presumptive validity of the Salt Lake City Ordinance 12.80.070, the
Appellees carry a heavy burden to show Salt Lake City abused its police power when the
ordinance was enacted. Appellees made no such showing in the trial court and the court noted
this fact in its order. R. 164.
Appellees claim the ordinance must be invalid because it irreconcilably conflicts with
U.C.A. § 41-6-87. It does not. The construction of bicycle lanes adjacent to the roadway on
certain streets in Salt Lake City is allowed under the enabling powers granted by U.C.A. § 416-17. Appellees do not argue to the contrary. Nothing in § 41-6-87 states that the city is

8

Nowhere in the Appellees' Brief do they claim that they presented any specific facts to
the trial court which would carry their burden to show that the ordinance in question was not a
valid exercise of the police power granted by U.C.A. § 41-6-17(h).
8

restricted in any manner in regulating travel in the bicycle lanes. § 41-6-87 specifically
requires use of such lanes when available. By definition bicycle lanes are not part of the
roadway. See f.n.5, supra. Since, by definition, bicycle lanes are not "roadways" as that term
is defined in U.C.A. § 41-6-1(39), there is no conflict with § 41-6-87 by allowing travel in
either direction in a designated bicycle lane.
Point II
THE ISSUES RAISED IN POINTS III AND IV OF APPELLANTS BRIEF ARE
PROPERLY BEFORE THE COURT FOR CONSIDERATION
A.

Introduction

At point II A of Appellees' Brief, it is argued that this Court cannot consider the
arguments made by Appellants in Points III and IV of their opening brief because they were
not raised in the trial court. Appellants' position is that these issues were in fact raised, at least
by implication, in the trial court. Moreover, even if they were not explicitly raised, the trial
court sua sponte dealt with and ruled on matters not raised by the parties. That entitles the
Appellants to argue the legal error in the ruling.
B.

This Court Should Consider The Arguments In Points III and IV of Appellants'
Brief Because The Court Reviews The Lower Court's Decision For Correctness

In the instant case, there were two issues pending before the trial court. Plaintiff asked
the court to rule that Tyler Hansen was legally entitled to ride in the left-hand bicycle lane.
Defendants asked the court to invalidate the city ordinance because it conflicted with U.C.A.

9

§ 41-6-87. Neither party asked the Court to rule on the nature of jury instructions to be given
at trial.
The trial court entered an order that refused to invalidate the city ordinance, yet ruled
that jury instructions must be given to the effect that Tyler Hansen was not entitled to ride in
the left-hand bicycle lane.
Neither side briefed nor argued the issue of jury instructions on negligence issues.
Notwithstanding, the trial court ruled sua sponte on what it considered to be a proper jury
instruction. Counsel for Plaintiff told the trial court that it was not being asked to decide what
effect a ruling that the ordinance was invalid would have on the legality of Tyler Hansen's
conduct at the time of the accident. Tr. at 7.
This is an interlocutory appeal. Whatever the decision of this Court, the case will be sent
to the trial court for final resolution. In reviewing an interlocutory order, the legal conclusions
of the trial court are reviewed for correctness by the appellate court. In re Estate of Waters, 29
P.3d 2 (Utah 2001). This rule particularly applies when the district court has interpreted a
statute. Jeffs v. Stubbs. 970 P.2d 1234 (Utah 1998).
As a general rule, an appeals court is free to affirm or reverse the legal conclusions of
a district court on any grounds for which there is a record to allow conclusions of law to be
made, even grounds that may not have been articulated by the district court, e ^ Weitzel v.
Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing. 240 F.3d 871 (10th Cir. 2001). In Utah,
when a lower court makes its decision based upon stipulated facts, the appellate court will

10

sustain the decision only if it is correct. In re Estate of Wolfmger. 793 P.2d 393, 394 (Utah
1990). The purpose of an interlocutory appeal is to either affirm the lower court's decision, or
to correct an erroneous decision, and thereby allow the case to be triad with a correct
determination of the legal issue. When a matter is remanded for further resolution in the trial
court, it is common for the appellate court to give instructions to the trial court respecting how
it should proceed, e ^ , InreEstateofKleinman. 970 P.2d 1286 (Utah 1998); Jeffs v. Stubbs,
supra.
In this case the Court is called upon to determine the correctness of the trial court's
ruling on the motions for summary judgment. Arguably, the trial court's decision went further
than either party expected because it established the scope of negligence instructions to be
given to the jury at trial.
The only issues raised in the motions and memoranda of the parties related to the
validity of the Ordinance 12.80.070. However, the trial court said:
The jury instructions will have to be properly tailored that plaintiff was not justified by
ordinance nor state law in traveling in the direction he was against traffic. R. 164.
Since the trial court, sua sponte, made a ruling that neither side requested, and because such
legal conclusions are reviewed for correctness, it would be proper to provide this Court with
legal arguments respecting the issue. In re Estate of Waters, supra; Jeffs v. Stubbs, supra;
Weitzel v. Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing, supra.
The purpose of an interlocutory appeal is to review an order for correctness, and to
correct legal errors made by the trial court to avoid further irregularity at trial. It would be
11

disingenuous to have the appellate court rule on the correctness of a legal issue without the
benefit of all pertinent legal arguments. That is different from asking an appellate court to
disturb a final ruling for reasons that were not argued to the lower court. In that situation,
issues raised for the first time on appeal should be reviewed only if there are exceptional
circumstances or plain error exists. Salt Lake City v. Ohms, 881 P.2d 884 (Utah 1994).
In an interlocutory appeal, a review for correctness should require the Court to consider
all arguments respecting the correctness of the lower court's ruling, whether or not they were
articulated to the lower court. In re Estate of Waters, supra; Jeffs v. Stubbs, supra; Weitzel v.
Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing, supra. Therefore it is just and proper for
this Court to consider all arguments that relate to the correctness or error of the trial court's
rulings on legal issues. Id. It would be counterproductive for the Appellants to ignore material
arguments that address the trial court's legal conclusions, only to later address them after
remand and at the end of trial. Judicial economy is best served by considering the issues raised
in Points III and IV of appellants' brief.
C.

The Issues Raised In Points III and IV of Appellants' Brief Were Before The
Trial Court

In their Motion and Memoranda, Plaintiffs argued that Tyler Hansen had a legal right
under Ordinance 12.80.070(1) to be riding his bicycle in the left hand bicycle lane at the time
of the collision with the Defendant's car. Defendants argued that the court should find
Ordinance 12.80.070(1) was invalid because it conflicts with U.C.A. §§ 41-6-87 and 41-6-

12

87.5. See R. 111-115. Therefore, Hansen's conformance with an invalid ordinance constituted
negligence. Id. The thrust of Defendants' argument was that the court should declare the
Ordinance invalid, and thereby allow them to claim Hansen was negligent by riding his bicycle
in the left-hand bicycle lane. Id.
At oral argument, Plaintiffs told the judge that the issue of negligence was not before
the court. TR at 6. The sole issue was whether or not Salt Lake City's Bicycle Ordinance,
entitled Hansen to travel eastbound in the north bicycle lane on 200 South. Id.
Plaintiffs told the trial court that invalidating an ordinance should not have retroactive
effect. That is, if Hansen was riding in conformity with the ordinance at the time of the
collision, he could not be held negligent as a matter of law if the trial court subsequently
invalidated the ordinance. Tr. At 7.
The only issues briefed to the trial court related to the validity or invalidity of the Salt
Lake City Bicycle Ordinance. However, the trial court's order discussed the propriety of a
negligence instruction at trial. The court said:
The jury instructions will have to be properly tailored that plaintiff was not justified by
ordinance nor state law in traveling in the direction he was against traffic. R. 164.
The issue of whether or not the trial court's ruling9 could apply retroactively was not
briefed, but was addressed by counsel for Appellants.

9

While the trial court expressly declined tofindthat the city ordinance was in conflict
with state law, and to invalidate the ordinance, the effect of the court's ruling that Hansen had no
legalrightto ride in the left-hand bicycle lane, as allowed by the ordinance, was to invalidate the
ordinance. As argued in Appellants' opening brief, this ruling is legally inconsistent.
13

The Court: ....But my-my questions are obviously why that ordinance is not a
conflict with state law and if he is allowed to drive in that bicycle lane, why does
that still—why does that still, as a matter of law, mean he's—there's no
negligence on his part?
Mr. Wells: Well, and we're not here talking about negli—whether it is or isn't
negligence your Honor, We're just talking about whether he has a legal right and
of course they would then extrapolate that into the instruction that's given—
The Court: Right. Okay. So, par—so the request for partial summary judgment
on each of your behalf is really just a request that I say, you can or can't ride in
the bicycle lane.
Mr. Wells: Yeah. Under the ordinance, does he have the right to be traveling
eastbound in that bicycle lane, period. And if—if he does, why then, the court
needs to so rule and if he doesn't, then that creates, really creates a little bit of
a problem, because my understanding of the law is that a statute or ordinance is
valid on its face until a court declares it otherwise.
And even if the court today were to say, I believe there's a conflict in the lawThe Court: Right.
Mr. Wells: -and I'm going to say that the State statute trumps the ordinance and
therefore, you can't ride eastbound on the north side, even though the ordinance
says you can, that would have prospective application only and they still would

14

not be entitled to use the instruction saying he was in violation of the law,
because at the time of the accident, the ordinance was extant, it said what it said,
he's entitled to rely on that until a court says the ordinance is invalid. Tr. at 6-7.
Thus, the issue of retroactive application of the court's ruling on the legality of riding in the
left-hand bicycle lane was before the trial court. The legal effect of the trial court's ruling was
to invalidate the ordinance ab initio, by saying the jury would be told Hansen had no legal right
to use the left-hand bicycle lane. Points III and IV of Appellants' Brief set forth the legal basis
for the claim of Appellants that the trial court erred by so ruling. Thus it is clear that the issues
briefed by Appellants in Points III and IV were in fact raised in the trial court.
Point III
THE REPEAL OR JUDICIAL INVALIDATION OF AN ORDINANCE DOES NOT
ALLOW PRIOR ACTION TAKEN IN RELIANCE UPON THAT ORDINANCE TO
SERVE AS A BASIS FOR FINDING THAT SUCH ACTION WAS NEGLIGENT.
In Point II B of the Brief of the Nature Conservancy,10 Appellees argue that the
argument made by Appellants in Point III of their opening brief is misplaced because:
The ex post facto authority relied upon by plaintiffs is inapplicable to this case. "The
protection against ex post facto laws applies only to criminal punishment, not civil
remedies." In re Ennenga. 2001 UT 111, Para. 18, 37 P.3d 1150; see also State v.
Daniels. 2002 UT Para. 42-46, 40 P.3d 611 (explaining what constitutes an ex post
facto law). This case is a civil action. Hansen is not being subjected to criminal
punishment. Brief of The Nature Conservancy at 18.
The above is the total of the Appellees' argument regarding Appellants' Point III.
10

Appellant Amanda Eyre has adopted the brief of The Nature Conservancy.
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The problem with the response of the Appellees' is that they misconstrue Appellants'
argument. The issue before the trial court was whether, under the Salt Lake City's Bicycle
Ordmance, Hansen had a right to travel eastbound in the north bicycle lane on 200 South. Id.
The Plaintiffs argued that even if the trial court were to strike down the ordinance, Hansen had
the right to ride his bicycle in the left-hand bicycle lane on the date of the collision, pursuant
to the ordinance. Hansen's position is that even were the court to invalidate the Ordinance, it
could not apply the ruling retroactively to make Hansen's prior conduct unlawful. To do so
would violate rights guaranteed to Hansen by Article I, Section 9 of the Constitution of the
United States and Article 1, Section 18 of the Constitution of the State of Utah which preclude
ex post facto laws. These constitutional guarantees protect one against laws that punish as a
crime an act previously committed, which act was innocent when done. See In re Ennenga,
supra.
This argument is not that Hansen would become subject to a civil claim of negligence
if the ruling were applied retroactively. It is that he would become subject to criminal
sanctions for violating criminal laws and ordinances which, absent the permission granted by
the ordinance, would make his riding on the left-hand side of a roadway a misdemeanor.
The constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws prohibits the retroactive
application of a ruling that criminalizes Hansen's conduct that was in compliance with the
language of the Salt Lake City Ordinance. That is, it would subject him to a claim that he
violated law when he rode eastbound on the north side of 200 south in the bicycle lane.
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Appellees did not respond at all to the Appellants' argument that enactments which
affect substantive law are not applied retroactively. Stated another way, a ruling by a trial
court which in effect invalidates an existing ordinance, thereby causing behavior consistent
with the terms of the ordinance to become invalid, can have no retroactive application.
Because retroactive invalidation of the right granted by the ordinance to ride in the lefthand bicycle lane could subject Hansen to the claim that he violated certain misdemeanor
statutes and ordinances which prohibit travel on the left-hand side of a roadway, the ex post
facto arguments would have application to retroactive invalidation of the city ordinance. The
only civil application of the argument would be the resultant claim that Appellees' would not
be entitled to request a jury instruction (MUJI 3.11) which allows a jury to base a finding of
negligence upon a misdemeanor violation.
POINT IV
ACTIONS TAKEN IN CONFORMANCE WITH AN EXISTING LAW
ARE NOT, OF THEMSELVES. NEGLIGENT
In Point IIB of the Brief of the Nature Conservancy, Appellees have misconstrued the
argument made by Appellants in Point IV of their opening brief. They state:
Plaintiffs' argument in Point IV, that acts which comply with city criminal ordinances
cannot be negligent, is simply erroneous. Plaintiffs cite authority defining lawful
conduct, but they do not cite any authority for the proposition that if one acts lawfully
and does not violate a criminal statute, one cannot be negligent. Brief of The Nature
Conservancy at 18-19.
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Point IV of Appellants' argument is not that conduct which is in compliance with the
requirements of law cannot be done in a negligent manner. Rather, it is that conduct in
compliance with the mandates of law cannot, of itself, be negligent.
For example, a person is allowed by law to proceed on a green light. If a person were
to come to an intersection on a green light and collide with a person standing in the roadway,
he might still be found negligent. However, he was not negligent simply because he entered
the intersection on a green light. His negligence would come from violating other duties he
had, such a failure to yield the right of way, or to keep a proper lookout.
The point being made by Appellants' Point IV is that Hansen had a legal right, granted
by ordinance 12.80.070(1), to ride his bicycle eastbound in the left-hand bicycle lane on 200
South at the time of the accident. The trial court did not find Salt Lake City ordinance
12.80.070(1) to be invalid. R. 164.
Appellants argument is that since the trial court declined to invalidate the ordinance,
Hansen was acting lawfully when riding in accordance with the express language of the Salt
Lake City Ordinance. Therefore, the trial court erred by ruling that "The jury instructions will
have to be properly tailored that plaintiff was not justified by ordinance nor state law in
traveling in the direction he was against traffic" (R. 164).
Tyler Hansen was entitled to rely upon the language of the ordinance as defining lawful
conduct. Such lawful conduct cannot be negligent of itself. Appellants might argue at trial that
some other behavior of Hansen as he rode eastbound in the bicycle lane constituted negligence,
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but the mere fact that he was traveling in the left-hand bicycle lane cannot, by itself, constitute
negligence. See Appellants' Brief at Point IV. Appellees do not discuss this claim in their
Brief, and offer no authority to the contrary.
Point V
THE RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT IS LEGALLY INCONSISTANT. IN ERROR,
AND MUST BE REVERSED
The trial court's June 5, 2002 ruling is inconsistent and erroneous. The Court first
states that defendants have provided no evidence upon which the court can make a ruling
that the city ordinance is invalid. R. 164. The court specifically states it is without
sufficient facts to make such a ruling. Id. Having ruled there is insufficient evidence upon
which to base a ruling that the city had no power to enact such an ordinance, the court,
without citation to authority, held it against the law to travel against vehicle traffic. There
is no finding that travel in a bicycle lane on either side of the road is "against vehicle
traffic". In fact there was no such evidence before the court. Moreover, cars are not
allowed to travel in the designated bicycle lanes. Therefore, when Hansen was riding in the
bicycle lane, it would be impossible for him to ride against vehicle traffic unless there were
cars illegally traveling in the bicycle lane.
The true error in the trial court's ruling came when he went beyond the issues
presented by the parties and ruled that:
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The jury instructions will have to be properly tailored that Plaintiff was not
justified by ordinance nor state law in traveling in the direction he was
against traffic (emphasis added). R. 164.
The court erred. Even if the ordinance was in conflict with state statutes, Hansen
was acting in compliance with an extant ordinance at the time of the collision. In addition,
the ordinance was presumptively valid. Ralph L. Wadsworth Construction, Inc. V. West
Jordan City, supra; Harmon City, Inc., v. Draper City, supra.
Plaintiffs motion for partial summary judgment simply asked the court to rule that
the extant ordinance gave Hansen the legal right to ride his bicycle in the left-hand bicycle
lane. The trial court refused and said Hansen had no such right. This court does not need to
decide if the ordinance is a valid exercise of the city's police power because such a ruling
cannot be retroactively applied. It would be dispositive of the issues before this court to
determine whether or not Hansen was entitled to conform his conduct to the extant
ordinance on the date of the collision.
Appellants' position is that Hansen had the legal right to travel eastbound in the lefthand bicycle lane on the date of the accident because such travel was specifically allowed
under Ordinance 12.80.070. The existing ordinance was presumptively valid on the date of
the collision. Appellants' motion for partial summary judgment on that narrow legal issue
should have been granted.
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Once that legal issue has been decided, a subsequent determination by a court that
the ordinance conflicts with a statute, and should be invalidated, cannot have retroactive
effect. See Points III and IV of Appellants' Brief, and Points III and IV, supra.
Thus, the question of whether or not there is a conflict between state law and the city
ordinance is not dispositive unless such a ruling can be applied retroactively. If the
ordinance was presumptively valid on the date of the collision, then Hansen's conduct was
lawful. If the ordinance is now found to be invalid, but such ruling has no retroactive
effect, then Hansen's conduct was lawful.
The trial court's ruling is erroneous because it says Hansen had no right to travel in
the left-hand bicycle lane as allowed by the ordinance. It should be reversed. Appellants'
motion for partial summary judgment should have been granted.

IY
CONCLUSION
The June 5, 2002 order of the trial court is patently inconsistent and erroneous. This
Court should reverse the Order entered June 5, 2002 and remand to the trial court with
instructions to grant Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment on the issue of Hansen's
legal right, on the date of the accident, to operate his bicycle in the left-hand bicycle lane on
200 South pursuant to Salt Lake City Ordinance 12.80.070(1).
Respectfully submitted this ]_j_ day of November, 2002.
Mel. S. Martin, P.C.
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